relatively high point, so less sexual activity counts as consensual one may achieve more protection at the cost of the sexual freedoms of the mentally disordered persons concerned. Williams favoured the former option: the threshold should be fixed at a relatively low point. The two reasons he gave for this in 1983 were 'First, this is necessary to prevent men who have intercourse with willing but sexually innocent girls from being convicted of rape. Secondly, it is necessary in order not to forbid sexual expression to women of low intelligence.'
4 As we will see much has changed in the scope and nature of the sexual offences since Williams was writing. Williams refers in the just quoted passage only to the offence of rape, but s30 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 takes in all potential sexual touching, from what would constitute rape to kissing and cuddling and everything in between. Moreover, while some ways of committing the offence under s30 can only be carried out by male defendants the offence in general can be perpetrated by persons of either sex. Victims can be of either sex. My main focus in what follows, with these changes and others in mind, is with Williams' concern with the risk that the law wrongfully forbids sexual activity by means of a misplacing of the threshold for a valid consent.
5
Below I examine four legal tests for attempting to fix the threshold at which a severely mentally disordered person can give a valid consent to sexual activity. I will have in mind the criminal law of England and Wales, though one of the four understandings I consider is from Australia. There are at least two common law understandings of the minimum conditions for consent which date back 4 Williams, Textbook, p. 571. 5 Because I believe that section 30 of the 2003 Act fails to fix the balance correctly between what are described above as the protective and facilitative functions of consent, emphasizing the former at the expense of the latter, my focus will exclusively be on the latter. That should certainly not be taken to imply that the protective function of consent is unimportant. Quite the reverse. 
II. Setting a High Threshold: the Sexual Offences Act 2003
I begin with the most recent test, from section 30 of the Sexual Offences Act, the test that sets the threshold at the highest point of the four. This will first require a quick word about one of the other tests, the animal instincts test, which we examine more fully in Part VI. It is clear that one of the major motivations in including specific new provisions governing sexual offences against the mentally disordered in the general overhaul of sexual offences in 2003 was the desire to dispense with the Fletcher animal instincts test. This had much to do with the fact that the test appears to have been applied in the unreported case of R v Jenkins in January 2000, something which caused a degree of disquiet. 11 Negatively at least Fletcher has influenced the current law. In Jenkins the defendant was a support care worker at a residential unit providing supported housing for about one hundred adults with learning disabilities in London. He admitted having a sexual relationship with a woman said to have a mental age of under three after she was found to be pregnant and DNA testing had implicated him. He was charged with rape. The judge, it seems, ruled that there was no reason in law why a severely impaired woman should not consent to sex and that the woman could have consented by way of her animal instincts according to the Fletcher test. Speaking in the legislative branch of the House of Lords prior to the passing of the 2003 Act, Lord Adebowle argued that the facts in Jenkins plainly establish the lack of capacity to consent on the part of the learning-disabled woman. He concluded, 'This case alone is a stark reminder of the need for new legislation and for laws to ensure that those who cannot consent have absolute protection of the law.'
Jenkins was alarming, his Lordship thought, 'not only because it would allow abusers to claim that sexual relations are not abusive, but also because it dehumanises the person with a learning disability and robs them of their privacy and dignity.' 'The lack of a clear definition in law of capacity to consent to sex makes it particularly hard to prosecute the most serious sex offences such as rape (which rely on proving lack of consent) when the victim is severely impaired and where there is no definition of capacity to consent. The purpose of the law, to protect the most vulnerable, can be lost in consideration of whether or not actively expressing sexuality was actually consent.
In one recent case (R v Jenkins), it was held that there was no reason in law why a severely impaired woman should not consent to sex. That is why those offences [i.e. those proposed for adoption in new legislation] intended to protect severely mentally impaired people do not require consent to be proved.' 13 Section 30 of the 2003 Act, was to dispense with the requirement that the prosecution prove a lack of consent on the part of the alleged victim. But I have here cited these words from the Home Office Steering Committee and, before that, those of Lord Adebowle in the House of Lords to illustrate the general hostility towards the animal instincts test. It is also interesting to note from the Home Office Steering Committee passage just cited that it takes the purpose of the law to be to protect the most vulnerable. We saw in the introduction to this paper that Williams wished to stress a further key purpose of the law of sexual consent, not only to protect but also to facilitate sexual freedom simply discussion of the case in relation to issues of paternalism in A P Simester envisaged is not of someone who consents against the odds or consents with great difficulty; it is of someone who cannot consent at all. The term 'impeding' is thus best ignored.
The conduct element of the offence is met by the intentional touching of another person where the touching is sexual and where the person in question is unable to refuse because of or for a reason relating to a mental disorder. As briefly noted in the introduction the offence is extremely wide, covering any form of sexual touching. It is among the most serious it is possible to commit: a sentence of fourteen years can be imposed if the touching is not penetrative and up to life is available to the judge if the touching is penetrative. Though it contains some interesting issues I will not here consider the fault element 17 , but turn now to the idea of 'refusal incapability'.
III. Refusal-incapability
One of the most striking features of the offence in s30 is that consent is ushered off the scene and replaced with the idea of capacity to consent, or to use the actual terminology, capacity to refuse. The conditions in (1) and (2) appear to be the most significant and I now consider how one might understand each of them.
IV. 'Sufficient Understanding of the Nature of What is Being Done'
The requirement of sufficient understanding of the nature of the activity presumably relates to the sexual nature of the conduct. That the touching is sexual has-as we have seen-also to be because of its nature it may be sexual and because of its circumstances or the purpose of any person in relation to it (or both) it is sexual.'
If we are simply to borrow this definition for the purposes of s30 (2), B will understand the (sexual) nature of the behaviour if a reasonable person would think it sexual. More subtly, where a reasonable person would be in some doubt as to whether the activity is sexual, but would think it a possibility that it is, B will need to be able to read the purposes of A and the circumstances of the touching. This may be especially difficult for a mentally disordered person. In Gosling, for example, A temporarily placed plastic bags over B's head and took photographs of B, which he admitted was for his later sexual gratification. 19 Had B been a mentally disordered person, there may be extra reason to doubt that she or he appreciated the nature of the activity. Again, it is usually clear to most adults what the difference is between an affectionate caress and a sexual caress. As Roger Scruton puts it, 'A caress of affection is a gesture of reassurance-an attempt to place in the consciousness of the other an image of one's own tender concern for him. Not so, however, the caress of desire, which outlines the body of the recipient; its gentleness is not that of reassurance only, but that of exploration.' 20 Plainly it will take some degree of experience and mental capacity on the part of a mentally disordered person to discern the difference. A third relevant consequence is an especially wide-ranging one given the wide scope of s30, covering all sexual touching. It is the emotional vulnerability that comes with sexual relations of any sort. Most obviously when people begin to touch one another sexually both parties or one of them becomes vulnerable emotionally to how he or she is treated by the other. From being treated royally one day, one can be ignored the next. One can be exploited or toyed with in a variety of ways. All this is common human experience; one can be left confused, disorientated and severely depressed (or elated) by the subsequent behaviour of the person with whom one has engaged in sexual touching.
When befalling those with very severe mental disorders, this familiar human phenomenon takes on a special poignancy. The section appears to imply that B must have the capacity to comprehend these Autonomous adults are aware more or less explicitly of this possible consequence of sexual relations.
Ordinary teenagers on the way to becoming fully autonomous learn for the most part that sexual touching brings with it such emotional vulnerability and in turn brings the power to exploit others.
Teenagers as part of growing up learn, one hopes, not to exploit the power that comes with the emotional vulnerability of those with whom they are engaging in sexual touching. any hint to the contrary should also be resisted. In sum, attending to something like a consent by way of animal, more specifically human, instinct may well be a way of granting respect and concern to some aspect of a person that is worthy of respect and concern. It is to focus on the capacities and abilities, indeed the lives, of the individuals concerned.
As for the word 'consent, 'it may seem out of place in any discussion of non-humans. It is interesting to note that Charles Darwin for one used the term in relation to non-human animals. On this Darwinian understanding, therefore, there can in a sense be both consensual-where a peahen rejects one peacock in favour of another-and non-consensual activity-where a red deer female is to have the attention of the dominant male whether wanted or not. As already mentioned the notion of consent is not intended by the ethologists in the normative sense in which it is used, as it must and rightly should be used in the human context, but it is interesting to note that even in this non-human context the notion of consent seems to have some clear limits. The activity in question cannot be unwanted and it needs to be with a specific other. Speaking of the Fletcher 'animal instincts' test, Simester and Sullivan suggest that it would be unacceptable for a defendant to be able to defend himself 'by raising the possibility of sexual arousal' on the part of a learning disabled person prior to the sexual activity in question. 38 While the moral condemnation may be over hasty, as I suggested above, Munby J also complained of the Victorian cases in general that they were not 'illuminating'. 39 The best reading of the 'consent by way of animal instinct' test, the reading that makes of it 'the best it can be,' 40 takes it as an attempt to identify something in a severely mentally disordered human being that is worthy of respect. However, in the end I think the idea of instinct is indeed too unilluminating to help achieve this aim. For while the idea of instinct as something like unlearned behaviour is very much evident in the behaviour of animals, human and otherwise, so much behaviour is an admixture of learned and The message is that while instinct, qua unlearned behaviour, is evident in the animal world it is commonly mixed with learning from experience. In fact sometimes when we speak informally about human instincts, the sense is not that the activity is exclusively unlearned. For example, one might hear a motorist report that she had 'braked instinctively' while driving, although driving was something that needed to be learned. The idea of instinct, then, is unlikely to be illuminating if understood as unlearned, unthought-out and so on, since so often such behaviour will be combined with learned behaviour. It seems moreover prohibitively complicated to operationalize in law any standard based on such instinct.
As far as the idea of a consent produced by animal instinct is concerned a few conclusions emerge. While the invocation of the 'animal' has been emotive in many of allusions made to the test, I have suggested that it could be as well rendered in terms of human instinct. Moreover, the best interpretation of the idea is of one that seeks to identify something worthy of respect in human beings who lack many of the standard capacities of most human beings. There is a sense of consent, we have noted, that has been used for example by Darwin to apply to the animal world. However, the stumbling block for the Fletcher understanding is the idea of instinct. It is simply too complex a matter to determine in animals, human or non-human, which aspects of their behaviour is learned and which unlearned for 'instinct' to lie at the centre of a workable legal test.
VII. From Instinct to Agency
Is there, in the present context, another route to identifying something worthy of respect in human beings who lack many of the standard capacities of most? What was the animal instincts test trying to capture? In our discussion of the 2003 Act we saw that the threshold for the capacity for consent was fixed cognitively, in terms of an understanding of the nature or reasonably foreseeable consequences of sexual activity. It appeared over-inclusive, taking in some forms of mutually desired sexual touching. This suggests that as well as focussing on cognitive questions of belief we should be focussing on volitional questions of desire. We have also seen that even in the case of non-human animals, Darwinians and others speak quite comfortably about choices and consent. Where I think this discussion is taking us is away from the notion of instinct and on to something else, namely agency. Though animals have sometimes been thought of as automatons, like the traditional Japanese Karakuri doll-like automaton that, when activated, shuffles forward, bows, and presents a cup of tea on a tray, automatism is now widely thought to be an untenable model for animal behaviour in general. 43 Many animals, such as dogs or cats, appear to have agency: they have desires and beliefs and can make certain choices.
Galen Strawson has usefully blocked out the elements of the notion of agency. He is clear that on his understanding many non-human animals, such as dogs, are agents. On his account one is an agent if and only if one is: 'The objects, means, &c are the weights, the man is the scale, the understanding of a convenience or inconvenience is the pressure of those weights, which incline him now one way, now another; and that inclination is the will.' 48 Richard Holton comments:
'Here we can see clearly the sense in which the decision-making process is passive: there is nothing more to the process of decision than letting the weight of one's understanding of the desirability of the various options press upon one. Indeed it is tempting to think that the decision machinery has no role at all. But that would be a mistake. To press the analogy: we need well-working scales if we are to weigh fairly. The point then is not that the scales are redundant; it is rather that they fail to make any discretionary contribution to the output. This is the sense in which the inputs determine the output:
once we know that the scales are true we know how the scales will move simply by knowing the weight of the objects put upon them. Things are parallel on the simple Hobbesian model of action.
Assuming that agents are well-functioning, their actions will be determined by the force of the inputs, The Hobbesian account, as Hobbes himself thought, is wide-ranging; it can be applied to both humans and non-human animals. While we can talk about choice and by extension consent on the account, it is the inputs (the desires of the human or the animal based on an understanding of the options) that determine the choice or the consent. The will as Hobbes put it is the 'last appetite in deliberating.' 50 It is something like this sort of account, I think, based on agency that the Fletcher test was really grasping at in trying to block out a minimum notion of consent, before invoking the unhelpful notion of instinct. In Fletcher itself the conviction of the accused was upheld. 51 Witnesses had said that the clearly profoundly disordered victim, Jane Jones, had not offered resistance to Fletcher but had 53 We cited an abridged version of the key sentence of the Chief Baron's judgment early on in the paper. In full his words are: 'Consent is the act of man, in his character of a rational and intelligent being, not in that of an animal. It must proceed from the will, not when such will is acting without control of reason, as in idiocy or drunkenness, but from the will sufficiently enlightened by the intellect to make such consent the act of There are a lot of accounts in the philosophical literature of action and the will with which one might profitably compare Palles CB's remarks. One, from R Jay Wallace draws a distinction between a motivated and an unmotivated desire. 55 A 'motivated desire' says Wallace, 'is one whose associated evaluative belief admits of a rationalizing explanation, where the desire is formed because the agent has arrived at the evaluative belief.' 56 When a person has a motivated desire, he suggests, it will always be possible to explain that desire in a way that shows it to be rationalized by other propositional attitudes that the person has. Thus psychological explanation of motivated desires will go beyond causal claims, about the states or conditions that trigger the onset of the desire. 57 Here we can point to a contrast with the interpretation of the animal instincts test suggested above, which does seem to amount to causal claims that trigger the unopposed desires we were discussing. Those desires, it would seem, are triggered in a simpler way, they are caused, they percolate up inside persons so to speak. But in the motivated desire explanation it is being explicitly claimed that the explanation is not restricted to causal claims, about the states or conditions that trigger the onset of the desire. 'Rather, motivated desires also (and necessarily) admit of a different kind of psychological explanation, in which the propositional content of the desire is shown to be rationalized or justified by the content of other of the person's attitudes.' 58 Wallace allows that it is possible for one propositional attitude to be rationalized by other attitudes of the agent's, without the rationalizing attitudes explaining the formation of the state that is rationalized; 'a rationalizing explanation requires, more strongly,' he says, 'that the person should be in the rationalizing state because he has certain other attitudes that What, finally, of the objection we floated earlier to the suggestion I made that the idea of agency as described by Strawson and which can be understood in a Hobbesian manner should be our starting point for the development of an idea of the minimum threshold for consent? The objection, as we saw, was that the Hobbesian account is too impoverished to be an account of human freedom and the will in general. For one thing it lacks, as Strawson suggested, the notion of self-consciousness. I would answer this in two parts. First, one should simply concede the main point: the Hobbesian account is too impoverished to succeed as a general account of human freedom. Secondly, however, it does not follow that it can have no role in the current context of identifying a minimum threshold for sexual consent on the part of severely mentally disordered persons. As we saw in our discussion of the 'rational will' test in Dee there may be a number of rationalizing explanations that the mentally 
